Changes to PSLF Following Perkins EO
It’s important to note that while this is not specific to BL, it’s crucial for those who are concerned about the Perkins and Covington Executive Orders. The administration has released guidance stating that individuals employed by organizations engaged in activities deemed to have a “substantial illegal purpose” (although the definition remains vague) are no longer eligible for the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program. This seems to be a concerted effort to hinder lawyers from challenging the Trump administration, particularly when combined with the recent biglaw Executive Orders.
Read more here: https://www.npr.org/2025/03/07/nx-s1-5321313/trump-executive-action-public-service-loan-program
2 Responses
It seems like the recent guidance regarding the PSLF and Perkins/Covington EOs raises significant concerns for legal professionals who may be working on challenges to the administration. The ambiguity around what constitutes an “illegal purpose” leaves a lot of room for interpretation, which could disproportionately impact lawyers in public service roles. This seems like a strategic move that could discourage legal challenges and limit options for those working in public interest sectors. It’s crucial for those affected to stay informed and consider advocating for clearer definitions and protections within the PSLF framework. This situation certainly calls for further discussion and scrutiny among legal professionals and advocates to ensure that public service roles, especially in challenging the administration, remain protected.
Thank you for shedding light on this significant development regarding the PSLF program in relation to the Perkins and Covington Executive Orders. The implications of labeling certain organizations or activities as having a “substantial illegal purpose” could indeed create complex challenges for lawyers committed to public service, particularly those who are already navigating the intricacies of federal loan forgiveness.
It’s worth highlighting that this shift not only impacts individual eligibility for PSLF but could also have broader consequences on the legal landscape, potentially discouraging pro bono work and advocacy against government actions that conflict with established laws and ethical standards.
Furthermore, as the definition surrounding “substantial illegal purpose” remains vague, it raises concerns about arbitrary interpretations that could disproportionately affect those in public interest roles, reinforcing the need for clear guidelines.
It may be beneficial for those affected to stay engaged and advocate for transparency in these policies, ensuring that the spirit of the PSLF program, which is to support individuals working in public service sectors, remains intact. I encourage fellow readers to share their thoughts and experiences navigating these changes, as collective advocacy could prove vital in addressing these challenges.